The Dish

He’s the main influence behind my new book, "The Conservative Soul," and I’m delighted that my 1989 doctoral dissertation on him, "Intimations Pursued," is going to be published later this year, as part of a series of books devoted to analyzing his thought. If Anglo-American conservatism is going to be revived in the twenty-first century, it will, I think, have to draw deeply on Oakeshott’s reconciliation of conservatism with modernity. One of the sharper younger Oakeshott scholars is Ian Tregenza, whom I met at the Oakeshott Society conference earlier this year. If you’re interested, here’s a podcast from an Australian radio show called "The Philosopher’s Zone," where Ian discusses Oakeshott with Peter Coleman. Here’s how the podcast is introduced:

The British philosopher Michael Oakeshott, who was born in 1901 and died in 1990, is a difficult man to pin down. He’s frequently described as a conservative, but there isn’t much in his thought that would have been of help to a political party, and his work is often seen as poetic and evasive. This week, we look at the work of a great – and strange – philosopher.

Listen here.

Big Sur, California, 2 pm.

The WaPo has an unsettling story today on how the strategy the president will unveil tonight emerged:

The Joint Chiefs were also worried that sending more troops would set up the U.S. military for an even bigger failure – with no backup options. They were concerned that the Iraqis would not deliver the troops to handle their own security efforts, as had happened in the past. They were particularly alarmed about the prospect of U.S. troops fighting in a political vacuum if the administration did not complement the military plan with political and economic changes, according to people familiar with their views.

Pentagon officials cautioned that a modest troop increase could lead to more attacks by al-Qaeda, provide more targets for Sunni insurgents and fuel the jihadist appeal for more foreign fighters to flock to Iraq to attack U.S. troops.

Even the announcement of a time frame and mission – such as for six to eight months to secure volatile Baghdad – would play to armed factions by allowing them to game out the new U.S. strategy, the chiefs warned the White House.

Then there was the thorny problem of finding enough troops to deploy. Those who favored a "surge," such as Kagan and McCain, were looking for a sizable force that would turn the tide in Baghdad. But the Joint Chiefs made clear they could muster 20,000 at best – not for long, and not all at once.

We may be about to hear a strategy disowned by the military brass, opposed by the party that controls both Houses, insufficient by the metrics of even its supporters, and a result of a compromise that has more to do with securing agreement in Washington than with actually turning the tide in Iraq. That’s my fear anyway. I don’t see the sufficient troop numbers to turn this around. And the economic reconstruction aspects seem to me to be pathetic.

A reader responds to John O’Sullivan’s case for staying in Iraq:

All of the arguments I’ve been reading simplify matters, even when they, as this argument by John O’Sullivan does, show other arguments to be overly simple.

The International Crisis Group, in response to the ISG analysis, reports:

"Contrary to the Baker-Hamilton report’s suggestion, the Iraqi government and security forces cannot be treated as privileged allies to be bolstered; they are simply one among many parties to the conflict. The report characterises the government as a "government of national unity" that is "broadly representative of the Iraqi people": it is nothing of the sort. … The only logical conclusion from the report’s own lucid analysis is that the government is not a partner in an effort to stem the violence, nor will strengthening it contribute to Iraq’s stability."

This report by John O’Sullivan gives too much credit to this "national unity" government, saying it is one of "three politico-military forces that could plausibly win the kind of military victory that would determine the political shape of Iraq." A moment later he concedes that improvements must be made, but according to O’Sullivan they need only be "marginal," to get the extremists out of the government.  But just a few paragraphs later he agrees that the Shiite militias – if we were to leave – "would have the backing of an increasingly Shiite-dominated government."  We have got to stop believing in this unity government; if we really want to move ahead with a politico-military push for success, then we need to free ourselves of the illusion that the Maliki government either (1) is the force we are in Iraq to support (as Tony Snow has told us recently) or (2) can be easily salvaged.

(Photo: Waziq Kuthaie/AFP/Getty.)

"Want a little tough truth with your morning coffee? McCain can do this, and Rudy can do that, and Romney can do the other thing. But if tonight’s speech doesn’t herald the beginning of a serious turnaround in Iraq that is plain to see by spring of next year, the Risen Christ could be the Republican nominee in 2008 and He wouldn’t be able to win against Al Sharpton," – John Podhoretz, National Review Online. A reader comments:

I generally concur with the spirit of what J-Pod is saying, but the premise is ridiculous. The Risen Christ would never make it through the GOP primary.

The Mexico border scene didn’t make it into the movie but Clive Davis has seen it.

From Patton, in the movies:

"Some Americans ask me, if completing the mission is so important, why don’t you send more troops? If our commanders on the ground say we need more troops, I will send them. But our commanders tell me they have the number of troops they need to do their job. Sending more Americans would undermine our strategy of encouraging Iraqis to take the lead in this fight. And sending more Americans would suggest that we intend to stay forever, when we are, in fact, working for the day when Iraq can defend itself and we can leave. As we determine the right force level, our troops can know that I will continue to be guided by the advice that matters: the sober judgment of our military leaders," – president George W. Bush, June 28, 2005, when more troops might actually have helped.

We may have a president with an excruciating ability to do exactly the wrong thing at the wrong time – every time.

(Photo: Mandel Ngana/AFP/Getty.)

A reader writes:

You ain’t seen nothing yet. Some weeks ago I had the misfortune to view an exhibition by Jack Dawson in Eureka Springs, Arkansas – on the grounds of Gerald L.K. Smith’s "Great Passion Play." (Yes, that Gerald L.K. Smith.)

Here’s a picture of Jesus in a GI’s uniform, mending an American flag. The title, "If My People," comes from 2nd Chronicles. There’s guide to the symbolism here:

Another wacky fave of mine is "Reviewing the Troops" — and in case you’re wondering just who’s doing the reviewing, look for the face of Jesus in the upper right-hand corner (it’s in the foliage of a tree). The paintings currently hang here.

This one may be the most informative yet, because its questions are more exhaustive, and its left-right/libertarian-authoritarian axis can yield more nuance. It’s also less dated. Try it yourself. I came out once again as a rightist libertarian – in the center of the lower right quadrant: socially lbertarian, economically conservative (but not extremely either). My actual scores: Economic Left/Right: 4.50; Social Libertarian/Authoritarian: -4.26