Failed States

After examining Ukraine’s depopulation, Edward Hugh asks “whether it is not possible that some countries will actually die, in the sense of becoming totally unsustainable, and whether or not the international community doesn’t need to start thinking about a country resolution mechanism somewhat along the lines of the one which has been so recently debated in Europe for dealing with failed banks.” Joshua Keating ponders this:

I suspect that even in the bleakest, Children of Men-style population scenarios, most countries would fight to the bitter end before surrendering their sovereignty. The exception might be places like Ukraine that have a relatively recent experience as part of a larger geopolitical entity and a large ethnic population with ties to a neighboring country.

A country couldn’t be liquidated quite as neatly as a company — even if the state goes away, there’s still a chunk of land and some people living on it to deal with. The main obstacle to countries being “dissolved” may be that other countries may not want to take on the responsibility of dealing with them — what country really wants to take on a new sparsely populated, economically stagnant region?

McArdle looks at similar problems closer to home. Why Detroit is in trouble:

The problem is that the old infrastructure is still there, and still needs to be maintained. Detroit might have the makings of a nice 50 square mile city within its population. But it has to maintain 139 square miles of water and sewer, electric, police and fire coverage, transportation, and so forth. It also needs to maintain legacy pension costs that were incurred when the city was more prosperous. For the last five or six years, Detroit has made up the mismatch between taxes and spending by borrowing money and deferring its pension contributions. But this only means bigger bills in the future, when Detroit may be even less able to pay.

The Daily Wrap

Today on the Dish, Andrew called for accountability at the IRS while the government took a credibility hit, wondered at the media’s silence on the recent New Orleans shootings, worried about intellectual freedom in research on race and IQ. Elsewhere, he cringed at Kessler’s assessment of the Benghazi scandal and remained unconvinced about its import while believers struggled to place it on a map. He pushed back against Greenwald’s view of world violence and digested cross-national perceptions in the “utopian project” that is the EU. In lighter fare, he defended dogs against Ryan Kearney and celebrated our 26,000th subscriber for the new Dish.

In political potpourri, readers pointed to Minnesota’s strong Lutheran as instrumental for marriage equality, Steve Stockman earned an Yglesias nod for his comments on abortion, and Jon Cohn probed Obamacare’s weaknesses. In scandal-mania coverage, the DOJ landed in hot water for collecting phone records and Nick Confessore got right to the heart of the IRS scandal. Kevin Drum predicted short-term upheaval as robots continue to enter the workforce and Ritchie King tabulated pot taxes in Colorado. In international coverage, we compared American economic growth to that in Europe as the US turned a blind eye to poppy production in Afghanistan.

In assorted coverage, honeybee populations plummeted while Priscilla Long found a familiar culprit responsible for the demise of the Neanderthal, and 1927 London brightened up. Ann Friedman embraced journalism’s new chaos, journals were the Twitter of the 19th century, Jessica Helfand listed the pros and cons of lists, and book bans left prison libraries with slim pickings. While Yglesias and Kevin Roose debated Gatsby’s credit score, David Haglund pondered fake reality entertainment and Sue Halpern cured doggie ennui with therapy training,

Meanwhile, Twitter mapped out hate, Bloomberg journalists crossed the line, college students navigated porn in the classroom, and The Economist traced our language patterns back to the 1066 Norman Invasion. Maple Leafs fell in the FOTD, we enjoyed a beautiful evening on the Oregon coast in the VFYW and cruised the tropics in the contest, and romance novels hit the dance floor in the MHB.

– D.A.

Race And IQ. Again.

[Re-posted from earlier today]

I should know better than to bring this up again. But the effective firing of a researcher, Heritage’s Jason Richwine, because of his Harvard dissertation should immediately send up red flags about intellectual freedom. I am not defending the Heritage report on immigration because I think it’s a loaded piece of agitprop. And I am emphatically not defending everything that Richwine has said and done (not least his disturbing willingness to be published in white supremacist magazines).

What I do want to insist is that the premise behind almost all the attacks – that there is no empirical evidence of IQ differences between broad racial categories – is not true. It is true (pdf), if you accept the broad racial categories Americans use as shorthand for a bewilderingly complex DNA salad (a big if, of course). There’s no serious debate about that. The serious debate is about what importance to assign to the concept of “IQ” and about the possible reasons for the enduring discrepancies: environment, nurture, culture, or genes – or some variation of them all?

For my part, I’ve come to doubt the existence of something called “g” or general intelligence, as the research has gathered over the years. I believe IQ is an artificial construct created to predict how well a random person is likely to do in an advanced post-industrial society. And that’s all it is. It certainly shouldn’t be conflated with some Platonic idea of “intelligence.” I don’t think it carries any moral weight at all, either, and I don’t think it should be used in any way in immigration policy. In fact, any public policy that rests on this kind of data is anathema to me. It’s far too close to eugenics, and to the morally repugnant idea that smarter people are somehow better in any meaningful sense.

But Richwine’s dissertation was mainly a quant-job. He comes across in this Byron York interview as a bit clueless – suspiciously so, I’d say – in extrapolating policy conclusions from IQ data in the context of immigration. But the core point about any dissertation is a simple one: does it hold up under scholarly scrutiny? Richard Zeckhauser, the Frank P. Ramsey Professor of Political Economy at Harvard, is on record as saying that “Jason’s empirical work was careful. Moreover, my view is that none of his advisors would have accepted his thesis had he thought that his empirical work was tilted or in error.” One of those advisors was the very serious and very liberal scholar Christopher Jencks.

I haven’t had time to read the thing, and some have cast aspersions on it after a browse. But it is abhorrent to tar someone researching data as a racist and hound him out of a job simply because of his results, honestly discovered and analyzed. One particularly disturbing statement came from 23 separate student groups at Harvard:

Central to his claim is the idea that certain groups are genetically predisposed to be more intelligent than others. In his troubling worldview Asians are generally at the top, with whites in the middle, Hispanics follow, and African Americans at the bottom. To justify his assertions he cites largely discredited sources such as J. Philippe Rushton whose work enshrines the idea that there are genetically-rooted differences in cognitive ability between racial groups.

We condemn in unequivocal terms these racist claims as unfit for Harvard Kennedy School and Harvard University as a whole. Granting permission for such a dissertation to be published debases all of our degrees and hurts the University’s reputation … Even if such claims had merit, the Kennedy School cannot ethically stand by this dissertation whose end result can only be furthering discrimination under the guise of academic discourse.

My italics. They are, of course, caricaturing the argument – I know of no scholar who believes that genes are entirely responsible for the racial differences. Here’s another caricature of it:

Human beings have not existed long enough to be divided into separate and distinct racial “species.”

Of course not. We remain the same species, just as a poodle and a beagle are of the same species. But poodles, in general, are smarter than beagles, and beagles have a much better sense of smell. We bred those traits into them, of course, fast-forwarding evolution. But the idea that natural selection and environmental adaptation stopped among human beings the minute we emerged in the planet 200,000 years ago – and that there are no genetic markers for geographical origin or destination – is bizarre. It would be deeply strange if Homo sapiens were the only species on earth that did not adapt to different climates, diseases, landscapes, and experiences over hundreds of millennia. We see such adaptation happening very quickly in the animal kingdom. Our skin color alone – clearly a genetic adaptation to climate – is, well, right in front of one’s nose.

But what the Harvard students are saying is worse than creating a straw man. They are saying that even if it is true that there are resilient differences in IQ in broad racial groupings, such things should not be studied at Harvard because their “end result can only be furthering discrimination.” You can’t have a more explicit attack on intellectual freedom than that. They even seem to want the PhD to be withdrawn.

Freddie deBoer and Reihan Salam have two good posts about this. Freddie:

Racism thrives on conspiratorial thinking and the self-definition of racists as an oppressed group. When you say things that are true aren’t, and especially when you do so in a way that treats the other point of view as forbidden, you play directly into their hands. I cannot imagine an easier way to give them fuel for their argument than to say that certain test results don’t exist when they do.

That’s my view in a nutshell. What on earth are these “liberals” so terrified of, if not the truth? Instead of going on racist witch-hunts, why don’t they question what IQ means, how great the cultural and environmental impact can be (very considerable), whether such tests should guide public policy at all, or examine how “race” as a social construct does not always correlate to specific variations in human DNA. Note how the terms “race” and “historical ethnicity” are not the same things, as Reihan does. Or do what the scholar Dana Goldstein has done – criticize Richwine’s dismissal of education and poverty as factors affecting IQ in his dissertation.

But please don’t say truly stupid things like race has no biological element to it or that there is no data on racial differences in IQ (even though those differences are mild compared with overwhelming similarity). Denying empirical reality is not a good thing in any circumstance. In a university context, it is an embrace of illiberalism at its most pernicious and seductive: because its motives are good.

(Thumbnail image: DNA molecule display at the Oxford University Natural History Museum. By Flickr user net_efekt)

London In Living Color

In 1927:

Kottke adds:

This footage was taken from the British Film Institute’s YouTube channel and it turns out there’s tons of color footage Friese-Greene shot around Britain in the 1920s. Like farm laborers in Devon in 1924, a busking family in Scotland in 1926, the docks in Cardiff in 1926, and much more. (via @magnakai)

Where Online Shows Shine

Alyssa lists the ways:

Amazon and Netflix don’t have to sell advertising, meaning that they can greenlight shows based on the extensive proprietary data they already have about what their viewers like in scripted programming, without having to try to triage the interests of both viewers and advertisers. Hulu, which sells both advertising and subscriptions, can balance what they think will bring in passionate viewers, and what will attract advertisers. Additionally, Hulu’s interactive tool, which lets viewers tell the service whether ads are relevant to them or not, can help advertisers place spots more effectively than the networks.

Alternative outlets also aren’t restricted by the tyranny of timeslots. They can order as much or as little programming as they like without worrying that picking one show means not going forward with another, or without anxiety about how their shows will fare in specific timeslots, flow together with their existing programming, or play against programming on other networks. The elimination of those restrictions gives alternative outlets enormous freedom that’s unavailable to network television—and an enormous comparative advantage when it comes to attracting the kind of talent who can make subscribers decide to pony up for a service.

Ignoring Afghanistan’s Poppy Culture

US policy towards the crop is back to a laissez faire approach:

“I promise you we’re not here to destroy your field,” [1st Lt. Christopher] Gackstatter tells the men. He asks about their backgrounds and their families. He repeats his promise that he’s not here to eradicate any poppies. “We understand you’re just trying to earn a living.” It’s several minutes before Gackstatter gets around to asking about the Taliban. Have insurgents been coming around to the fields? No, says Khan Mohammad, one of the brothers. Are the men planning on selling their paste to the Taliban or another buyer? Mohammad says he’s not sure yet who they’ll sell to.

This intelligence-gathering mission seems to be going nowhere. But after half an hour or so Mohammad grows more comfortable and expansive. He explains that today’s poppy prices are down compared to the golden years of the late 1990s, when the Taliban was in charge, there was no eradication — token or otherwise — and U.S. troops weren’t hanging around trying to figure out how they felt about the crop. “People are still dreaming of the boom years,” he says.

True, the Americans might finally have figured out, after 12 years of war, that it’s best to leave poppies alone. But they’ve left behind them a patchwork legacy of eradication. In short, for millions of Afghans who rely on poppies for their livelihoods, the Taliban era was simpler.

The Neanderthals’ Handicaps

Priscilla Long presents some theories as to what led to the demise of our evolutionary cousins – shorter lifespans and climate change among them:

Because they had bigger bodies, they required more calories to survive than we do. They may have lacked sewing skills. Neither Neandertals nor Homo sapiens lived long (the rare 30-year-old Neandertal was old), but at some point, for reasons not really understood, the life spans of Homo sapiens began to increase. More longevity provided a grandparent generation to impart knowledge, skills, and more resources to the group.

Another discovery bearing on the subject are the extreme climate fluctuations that occurred between 65,000 and 25,000 years ago. The Neandertals had bodies and cultures adapted to ice and snow. This time of fluctuation involved such rapid climate change that in one lifetime “all the plants and animals that a person had grown up with could vanish and be replaced with unfamiliar flora and fauna,” writes Wong. The environmental stress may have decimated their ranks to below zero population growth.

Uncandid Camera

This video, understandably, went viral last week:

As you might have guessed, the video was probably staged. David Haglund asks:

[I]s such fakery OK? A year ago, after Mike Daisey’s fabrications in a This American Life story about Apple factories in China came to light, we examined how much lying people are generally willing to accept from various kinds of storytellers. (See the resulting infographic below.) Two things we learned would seem to apply here. First, when humor’s involved, people grant a lot more latitude. David Foster Wallace’s unacknowledged use of composite characters in his very funny pieces for Harper’s and elsewhere disappointed some people, but it has not really besmirched his reputation. David Sedaris fictionalizes his “nonfiction” considerably, and yet when this is pointed out, most people shrug.

The second relevant lesson is that people seem to hold writing to a higher standard than storytelling on screen or on a stage. Comedians say that things happened to them just the other day that have never happened to anyone on any day. Nobody minds.

26,000 Subscribers

That’s the number we just passed a few minutes ago. Thanks so much for this level of support. 26,000 is a great little magazine. And to have effectively created it since January without any marketing, expense, or even a publisher is a testimony to your belief in a future for online journalism that is more signal than noise, and your dedication and devotion to the Dish. We’re immensely proud and grateful.

Just a recap for new readers. Here’s the manifesto for this new media venture. And [tinypass_offer text=”click here”] to subscribe for full access to the Dish for only $1.99 a month or $19.99 a year or anything you want to pay above that minimum. It takes a couple of minutes max.

Conquering Vocab

The Economist‘s language blog considers the linguistic legacy of the 1066 Norman invasion:

When the Normans, who spoke a dialect of Old French, ruled over England, they changed the face of English. Over the ensuing two centuries, thousands of Old French words entered English. Because the ruling class spoke Old French, that set of vocabulary became synonymous with the elite. Everyone else used Old English. During this period, England’s society was diglossic: one community, two language sets with distinct social spheres.

Today, English-speakers pick and choose from the different word sets—Latinate (largely Old French borrowings) and Germanic (mostly Old English-derived words)—depending on the occasion. … In informal chat, for example, we might go on to ask something, but in formal speech we’d proceed to inquire. There are hundreds of such pairs: match/correspond, mean/intend, see/perceive,speak/converse. Most of us choose one or the other without even thinking about the history behind the split. Germanic words are often described as earthier, simpler, and friendlier. Latinate vocabulary, on the other hand, is lofty and elite. It’s amazing that nine hundred years later, the social and political structure of 12th-century England still affects how we think about and use English.