Tag: Iran

Ebrahim Moussa thinks the two regimes have steered new Muslim democracies away from the Islamist route.

by Zack Beauchamp

Alireza Nader gives some background on the Revolutionary Guard/Ahmadinejad infighting:

Ironically, the Guards played a critical role in Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005 and 2009. Ahmadinejad was once even considered to be among the Guards' closest allies; he allowed them to amass political and economic power during his presidency. Ahmadinejad publicly suggested that he knows their secrets, as he hinted about smuggling. And he may air more inside information if he feels further threatened.

The Guards are known to be a fractured force. Some members support the reformists, while others are loyal to Ahmadinejad. However, top Guards appear to be solidly behind Khamenei, who has ensured leaders of the elite military wing that they will be powerful long-term guardians of Iranian politics. Khamenei and Jafari are unlikely to allow the political faction loyal to Ahmadinejad to win elections for parliament in 2012 and the presidency in 2013.

by Chris Bodenner

Justin Elliott recently followed up with Jeffrey Goldberg’s Atlantic cover story from September that assigned a >50% chance that Israel would bomb Iran by July 1:

Goldberg also pointed to several “interesting” developments after the publication of his story: revelations about the Stuxnet worm dealing a blow to Iran’s nuclear program; a series of high-profile statements by former Mossad chief Meir Dagan opposing a strike on Iran as “stupid;” and communications between American officials and their Israeli counterparts that Goldberg said were prompted by his Atlantic story. He said that Obama officials reached out to the Israelis to reassure them that “we’ve got this” — but Goldberg added he’s not sure how much stock to put in those communications. […]

Goldberg still believes that in certain circumstances the current Israeli government would attack Iran’s nuclear sites. “Meir Dagan is doing what he’s doing now because he’s scared of an Israeli attack,” he said. “If you don’t think Bibi Netanyahu is crazy enough to launch an attack on Iran, you don’t understand this prime minister.”

Dagan has claimed credit for putting the brakes on Bibi, but Goldberg in his latest column contends that Dagan’s dissent is actually having the opposite effect:

His public denunciations may actually bring Israel closer to launching an attack. He has undermined the credibility of Israel’s deterrent posture. Western intelligence agencies, the Obama administration and the International Atomic Energy Agency all suspect that Iran’s leaders are moving steadily toward a nuclear bomb, less fearful of an Israeli strike than they were last year. The Iranians, intelligence officials told me, believe Dagan’s statements reflect the position of Israel’s defense establishment.

They don’t. But this perception is critical. If Israel does attack the Iranian nuclear program, it will in part be because Dagan undermined his country’s deterrent credibility.

Over at Goldblog, Jeffrey highlights the latest example of loyal opposition: the criticism of World Jewish Congress President Ronald Lauder toward Netanyahu’s approach to the upcoming UN vote on Palestinian statehood.

Stephen Walt reminds us that a single policy can affect more than a single country:

[I]f a few other states were thinking a bit about acquiring nuclear weapons and took a look at Iran's experience, and then concluded that pursuing the bomb just wasn't worth all the aggravation, then Iran's experience might have broader positive effects.  It teaches that if you try to get a bomb, you'll face censure, demands for inspections, lots of diplomatic hassle, and maybe even mildly inconvenient economic sanctions. … So while sanctions may have failed in dealing with a hard case like Iran, they may have helped reinforce global nonproliferation norms and thus persuaded a few other states not to start down that road themselves. And if that is indeed the case, then "Policy X" (in this case economic sanctions) may have a more positive "net effect" than a simple focus on Iran might suggest.

A reader writes:

It seems to me your reader is on to something very important. In my own recent visit to Iran, I didn't speak with every single member of the opposition within Iran, but I did get a strong sense from those I did listen to, that their nationalism overrides most other concerns. Iran is the most USA-friendly country in the entire Islamic world. But there is no way the Iranians I met would see any form of US intervention positively.

Also, I was surprised by the number of Iranians I met who felt they had a legitimate democratic system that was only temporarily hi-jacked by Ahmedinijad and his gang. In my (amateur) view, a lot of the green movement seemed to be be people who wanted a return to the legitimacy of their own system, not at all a proximation to western society.

I can understand the Iranians who feel like this.

Iran is a wonderful country. Beautiful, rich, filled with 5000 years of world heritage, filled with the nicest people in the world. Seriously. These people are good (if a bit full of themselves – but they have a reason to be so). The comparison with Texans isn't completely off the mark, if Texans had world-class monuments, artworks, poets, thinkers, wines, cuisine etc.

Now don't misunderstand me. Iran has a vile dictatorship, ruled by gangs and nuts. But it is also a lot more than that. And it is in no way comparable to any of the other problem-countries of the Islamic world. Rather than comparing Iran with Syria and Iraq or Pakistan and Afghanistan, one should compare it with Russia, Poland or maybe (less) the Czech Republic. A highly developed, cultured and civilized country with a really, really bad government, which has its legitimacy from the least intelligent dealings of the Cold War.

They also have a system that facilitates this bad government, but as I see it, relatively few Iranians recognize this. And anyway – as one smart Iranian put it – the US system is far more corrupt and far less democratic. I don't agree with this common Iranian point of view, but I understand it.

It’s two years to the day since the Green Movement met its moment of truth. In honor of the fallen and of those still languishing under the coup regime, we offer a few flashbacks and reflections on that extraordinary period. Dish coverage on the eve of the Iranian election can be found here and here. The following email sent to us on June 11 best encapsulates the moment:

I just saw your post requesting input from voting Iranians, and I’ve lived most of my life abroad and go to an American university, I will vote tomorrow at an Iranian embassy.  My family’s four votes will go to Mousavi.

I’m not voting for Mousavi because I’m a fan of his politics, although I haven’t read anything  objectionable among his stances yet.  The vast majority of Iranians sincerely believe in Iran’s right to nuclear power (not weaponry), and think Iran should have good relations with the US but want to have their grievances aired.  Much as you and I may disagree with these notions, Mousavi can’t go against them yet.  Karroubi is more of a reformist candidate, and of course, some of the hundreds of candidates who got left on the cutting room floor would have been better choices, but you play with the hand you have.

I agree with you that something is happening in Iran.  Although I haven’t been there this election season, what I hear from my cousins is that people are really into this election.  There has been street fighting and non-stop political debates on university campuses.  In a secretive society where having your political opinion too well-known can get you in trouble, tens of thousands of people are showing up every day at rallies that brazenly call the incumbent a liar and a thief.  Mousavi’s supporters aren’t just among the young, middle class, and female either – plenty of people in the smaller cities and provincial capitals are flocking to him. 

Part of me feels like this might be a make or break moment for reformists.

If Mousavi wins, the conservatives will do everything they can to undermine him, the way they did with Khatami.  But if he loses, the situation becomes far worse, because, as Ahmadinejad has indicated in widely publicized private comments, there’s no way he’ll win and NOT try to make himself president-for-life.  Iranians seem to have two paths: they can either elect a Gorbachev, make some sacrifices, and hopefully get an improved political system in a couple of decades, or they can elect a Saddam and watch as their country goes down the road of Iraq.

One more thing: do not discount the power of vote rigging.  I expect the vote to be close, but anything that gives Ahmadinejad more than 60% of the vote has definitely been rigged.  Of course, there are also more subtle ways of modifying the outcome: bussing his supporters to the booths with state funds, running out of ballot paper in the voting booths of Tehran, voter intimidation by armed thugs, and so on.

Anyway, the main reason I’m writing to you is to thank you for your attention to this very important issue.  I know Iran isn’t the most important country in the world by any metric, and is always in the news for the wrong reasons, but it does surprise me that so many American politicos, on both sides of the political aisle, who claim to have the best intentions of the Iranian people at heart are totally ignoring this important election.  God bless you and Josh Marshall.  If the worst does indeed happen tomorrow, at least there will be some record of the nation’s resistance in the mainstream American political dialogue.

Regardless of the final count tomorrow, I think this will be a huge milestone of democracy in the Middle East.  While Iranians have in the past made bad choices, they are WAY ahead of their peers in the Muslim World when it comes to democracy.  In 1905, before the vast majority of Muslim states even declared independence, Iran already had a constitution and the right to vote given to all men.  Iran had an actual revolution the year after, where people fought the monarch’s men in the streets so they could protect their new rights.  From 1940 to 1952, Iran actually had an almost functional democracy, while most of its neighbors either had dictators or monarchs.  Iranians brought about another revolution for expanded political rights in 1979, before most of the Eastern European nations threw off the yoke of Communism.  Let’s hope they teach a thing or two to their neighbors again tomorrow.

Famed Iranian director Jafar Panahi wanted to make a fictional film about the aftermath of the disputed 2009 presidential election in Iran. For that he was sentenced to 6 years in prison and has been barred from making movies for 20 years. His newest project, In Film Nist (This Is Not a Film) just premiered at Cannes. Tehran Bureau reports:

Smuggled into France on a USB stick hidden inside a cake (flavor unidentified to shield the identity of its baker and/or courier), it is officially credited as an "effort" by Panahi and [collaborator Mojtaba] Mirtahmasb. As for the rest of the credits, they give "Thanks to colleagues:" — followed by a blank screen — and "Many thanks to:" — followed by another. At one point, as Mirtahmasb shoots, Panahi says, "Go on, cut." "You can't direct," his collaborator replies. "It's an offense." Indeed. In the absurd, incredible, but very real world of This Is Not a Film, what isn't?

A tipping point for an Israeli first strike? Gulp. Goldblog mulls the details here.

Interesting revelation in a recent Donald Rumsfeld interview when he discusses how George W. Bush handled the possibility of Iran getting nuclear weapons:

The pressure was to move diplomatically, not militarily, and the Bush administration during that period was, on some occasions, trying to generate support from other free nations in the world to put pressure on Iran and the Iranian government to behave in a manner, and discontinue their nuclear program. It was with minimal success. And the administration, you know, would blow hot and cold as to how they wanted to handle it. Sometimes, they would avoid negotiations. Other times, they would have Americans actually talking at various venues with the Iranians.

As you may recall, the right used Obama's willingness to negotiate with Iran as a cudgel during the 2008 election. This exchange about the rationale for going to war in Iraq is of interest too:

Hugh Hewitt: How much was this democracy movement on President Bush’s mind before the war began, Secretary Rumsfeld? And how much of that is a make good when the WMD weren’t found?

Donald Rumsfeld: That’s hard to answer. I don’t recall the idea of bringing democracy to Iraq as being part of the discussions in the National Security Council during the period with a build up towards the conflict with Iraq. It is, as you suggest, that, those words tended to become more prominent after the war had, major combat operations had been completed, and the subject of WMD had not been found in the kinds of supplies that had been anticipated, although there were certainly people capable of that. And the Duelfer report shows that Saddam Hussein indeed had maintained his capability to rapidly increase his weapons of mass destruction.

Hugh Hewitt: So you don’t recall deputy secretary Wolfowitz making that argument?

Donald Rumsfeld: I don’t, and I don’t recall the President doing it, or Secretary Powell.

Wylie profiles seven Iranians arrested after the 2009 protests who are still in jail.