Tag: Iran

John Bolton is still itching for a war. In response, R.M. at DiA asks:

Why is it that those wishing to see military action against Iran tend to end their analyses the moment the bombs strike the republic's nuclear facilities? This is somewhat reminiscent of the short-sighted planning that went into the Iraq war, which taught us that stuff happens as a result of our actions. The hawkishness of folks like Mr Bolton is based on the idea that Tehran is an evil, unpredictable force—for example, Mr Bolton dismisses the argument that a nuclear Iran could be deterred because "Iran's theocratic regime and the high value placed on life in the hereafter makes this an exceedingly dangerous assumption." What, then, should we assume about the mullahs' response to a direct attack on their country? To use the words of Mr Bolton, surely pre-emptive military force (whether carried out by America or Israel) would set up another "stark, unattractive reality"—the very real possibility of a regional war. Perhaps that does not tip the scale in favour of the largely-toothless alternative option. But it should certainly be part of the debate.

The neoconservative mindset is less concerned with real-life effects and consequences of actions than with the a priori ideological propriety of such actions. That was, in so many ways, my own profound error in the buildup to the Iraq war. I was far more content congratulating myself for the high morality of ridding the world of a monster like Saddam than examining the exact details of the WMD intelligence or the precise plans for occupying Iraq after victory.

I was thinking like an ideologue, not like a conservative. I have learned my lesson. But when, like Bolton, you are dealing solely with abstractions and raw force, learning lessons is for wusses.

Patrick Berry advocates a light touch:

The overall picture is one of an Iranian economy that is heavily straight jacketed already. The current government is largely to blame. Based on the regime's track record of incompetence and the consequences of that incompetence for the Iranian economy, the U.S. would be wise to take a step back, allowing Iran to continue on its present course. As its position grows weaker, the U.S. position would grow stronger, shoring up American diplomatic leverage or at least making Iran easier to contain or deter. The U.S. would also sidestep accusations that its policies had contributed further hardship to the Iranian people. Congress is searching for the most effective means to weaken the Iranian economy; the best approach may be for it to do nothing at all.

Kevin Sullivan thinks that I may have misunderstood him.

Reformist MPs met yesterday with Rafsanjani, Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami. Scott Lucas supplies a snap analysis:

1. This conflict has always been more than just the Green Movement v. the regime. Some coverage of 22 Bahman (11 February) fed that misleading view; the events yesterday demonstrate that we can now put away the narrative of “it all ended on that day”.

2. Rafsanjani, Mousavi, and the reformists all signalled that they want to work within the framework of the Islamic Republic, and Rafsanjani in particular made it clear that there should be no challenge to the Supreme Leader. At the same time, all also stated firmly that the Government has distanced itself from the people, the marker of continuing and possibility escalating challenge to Ahmadinejad.

Meanwhile, Khamenei moves closer to Ahmadi by backing his plan to "sharply curtail the country’s long-established system of state subsidies."

And what's so wrong about it? Kevin Sullivan asks and answers an obvious question:

The fact that these two countries – both, just a quarter of a century ago, having been engaged in arguably the nastiest, bloodiest war in modern Mideast history – have come this far would normally be the stuff of historical praise; something akin to Europe's rise from warring rivals to peaceful partners.

Of course it would. The trouble is: Americans can rightly ask if this is what they gave $1 trillion and thousands of lives and tens of thousands of casualties for?

Let's assume that the new eruption of Qaeda-style violence doesn't throw Iraq back into total sectarian warfare. Let's assume that, ok? The best we can hope for is some kind of ramshackle, chaotic and weak state, more sympathetic to Iran than Saddam would ever have been, and one incapable of truly controlling Jihadist elements, and in danger of losing some Sunni areas to Qaeda influence and control. 

We still don't know if the Iraqracy can construct a multi-sectarian central government, the acid test of the surge. We have seen encouraging but still tentative signs of a post-sectarian mindset among Iraqi voters. But if or when the Iraqi government asks the US to leave, the unintended ripple effects of the worst decision in decades will continue.

Good news in intelligence.

Scientific American checks out research on the subject:

As diverse as people are in ascribing sacred status to possessions, they are equally varied in which values they consider sacred, a diversity that can breed substantial conflict. The abortion debate, for example, often presents a divide between those who consider woman’s “right to choose” sacred versus those who consider a fetus’ “right to life” sacred. A recent study in the journal for Judgment and Decision Making assessed how the Iranian nuclear defense program has become a sacred value and how this affects negotiation over Iranian disarmament, an issue of growing global concern.

Just last month Iran defied the United Nations in beginning to enrich its uranium supply to bolster its nuclear program. The recent study on this topic by Morteza Dehghani and colleagues, offers two key insights. It demonstrates how a relatively recent issue, one that—unlike abortion—lacks any longstanding historical or religious significance, can become sacred. And it suggests, surprisingly, that offering material incentives in exchange for sacred values may backfire badly. The work is a reminder that sacred values are tremendously influential in disputes both international and interpersonal, but that our negotiating instincts can lead us away from common ground.

Musings On Iraq reads between the news leaks:

Iran is definitely supporting Shiite parties in Iraq’s 2010 parliamentary voting as it always has, and did help put together the National Alliance. That suits its main goal, which is a Shiite run government in Baghdad that will be friendly to Tehran and never become a rival again. After Iraq’s voting is finished on March 7, Iran will likely push for the Alliance and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law to mend fences and form a ruling coalition again. That being said, the regime in Tehran is facing a major internal crisis with its public after its own presidential balloting.

The Revolutionary Guards were originally formed to protect the Islamic government, and would thus naturally be asked to help in a time like the present to shore up the leadership. It could still be supporting its friends in Iraq without being intimately involved in day-to-day affairs there as it was in the past. Either way, Tehran will continue to play a leading role in Iraq as it has supporters amongst many of the country’s leading parties, is one of the largest trade partners with Iraq, and is the main supplier of religious tourism and students to holy sites in Baghdad, Najaf, and Karbala. Even with its own political problems, Iran will still have these hard and soft power levers to influence events in Iraq.

A reader writes:

This is not the strongest argument against engagement, the strongest argument is regime stability. If you think that the regime will fall in a year if not months then engagement with the regime is just destroying US’s political capital among the Iranian public. What do you get in return? Do you expect the new government recognize all the deals that were made in the last days of the previous regime? This is why from the beginning the Leveretts dispute the idea that the election was stolen (well they say there is no hard evidence!), that the green movement has any force whatsoever or that the regime is in any immediate danger.

People tend to forget but regime’s problems are not contained to legitimacy and political issues. The far bigger problem is the finances of the Iranian government.

With the removal of subsidies and the devaluation of Rial (the Iranian currency) against the dollar you will have runaway inflation and an angry public. For example the Ahmadinejad government has already delayed the removal of gas subsidy for 3 months; now it is set to expire at the start of the summer instead of winter. Another example from everyday life in Tehran is that while the law to implement a 3% VAT was scrapped due to protests several years ago, the government owned have started to collect it these days. The Iranian government won’t survive this without a major spike in the oil prices or a military attack from Israel/USA.

My response to Mr. Leverett’s call for engagement would be “why now?” If you are right and US has not engaged Iran properly for the past 31 years then just wait another 6 months.

I enjoyed the lively debate here on this while I was gone. At this point, I feel we are at a moment when the benefits of being open to engagement – as a way to avoid the regime playing the Great Satan card against the Greens and to remind the international community that it is Tehran and not Washington that is the problem – are drawing to a close. We should now be focusing on targeted sanctions and getting the Chinese on board, with Russian help. This still won’t be easy.

But it’s the strongest hand we have to play (even though it’s not as emotionally satisfying as neoconning them with a megaphone); and it’s the last option before containment. Then we have to prevent Netanyahu giving Ahmedinejad exactly what he wants. And if you think getting sanctions in place will be hard …

by Patrick Appel

Joyner scores the Leverett and Ledeen debate:

I find that one rarely goes wrong taking the most pessimistic assumptions of both sides and assuming they’ll come true. Ledeen is almost certainly right that the United States and Iran are simply too far apart to come to an amicable general accord. It would be great if Iran would help us solve all our myriad problems in the region but they’ll only do so in those cases where they can’t afford to do otherwise.

But I agree with Leverett that the implosion of the Islamist regime is a neocon fantasy.

We’ve been counting on the “Iranian moderates” since Ollie North and the gang cooked up their elaborate arms for hostages deal and been continually disappointed. The Green movement that has Americans all a-Twitter is not the rise of a Jeffersonian democratic movement but the backers of a competing regime-approved Islamist candidate. Hard evidence or no, I’m pretty sure the last election was stolen. Hell, I’m pretty sure the one before that was stolen, too. But, at the end of the day, the Iranian president is a hood ornament. Iran is run by the ayatollahs, not the suits.