“I was indeed stationed at Abu Ghuraib prison from October 2003 thru late March 2004. I was in the 870th MP Company. The one listed as having had its Commander relieved for snapping photos of female soldiers naked in the shower.
I do not excuse what went on whatsoever. All of us who served honorably over there want to see these idiots fry.
I’ve read the 15-6 investigation report and all of the problems we identified and reported up thru the chain of command show up in that report. Lack of staffing, training and written guidance. Most of the latter we had to write ourselves, based on Rules of Engagement (ROE) and what we learned in the battlefield hand off from the preceding units and what we could apply doctrinally. Our unit, being a Combat Support Company, had no prior experience in or training in Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations. Our preMob training had nothing to do with it either, as it was more focused on basic soldier skills and survivability and Combat Operations, such as car searches, convoy escort, building clearing, prisoner search. In fact, our fist mission was in Karbala from June 2003 to the end of September 2003 and involved the above listed missions as well as runing the Karbala Police Station and training new Iraqi Police Officers. But I digress…
One of the points brought up in the 15-6 regards morale. One has to have been there to fully appreciate just how far morale had sunk. Here’s what the report said about factors affecting morale:
(U) Reserve Component units do not have an individual replacement system to mitigate medical or other losses. Over time, the 800th MP Brigade clearly suffered from personnel shortages through release from active duty (REFRAD) actions, medical evacuation, and demobilization. In addition to being severely undermanned, the quality of life for Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCF) was extremely poor. There was no DFAC, PX, barbershop, or MWR facilities. There were numerous mortar attacks, random rifle and RPG attacks, and a serious threat to Soldiers and detainees in the facility. The prison complex was also severely overcrowded and the Brigade lacked adequate resources and personnel to resolve serious logistical problems. Finally, because of past associations and familiarity of Soldiers within the Brigade, it appears that friendship often took precedence over appropriate leader and subordinate relationships.
The undermanning led to 12 to 16 hour days, sometimes working 2 shifts per day with no days off. The report doesn’t mention that there were periods of months where a mortar attack took place every day! Soldier going out on patrol at night were blown up with IEDs and rockets. Prior to the Fallujah Battle that started in late March, Abu Ghuraib prison had the distinction of being the most attacked place in Iraq.
The stress of living under constant threat of mortar attack plus the lack of downtime, coupled with an obviously broken Command structure and dismal environment…imagine being stationed at Dachau for the year after the liberation of Europe, living in a cell that was host to God knows how many executed and tortured human beings before you got there. Then add all the stress from all that other crap. Words cannot describe the effects of the combination of it all.
That so few soldiers abused Iraqis is testament to the discipline and strength of the vast majority of the 1000 soldiers stationed at Abu Ghuraib at the time.” I checked this guy’s credentials out (military i.d., email, etc, even a photograph). In so far as I can vet these emails without personal, face-to-face interviews, I do. But this is a blog, not the NYT. More feedback – including a defense of Ted Rall – on the Letters Page.
The Dish 