Cool Ad Watch

Copyranter calls this subtle and clever spot "the commercial of the year so far":

It's a little long, but I guess the agency figured :30 wasn't long enough to set-up the joke, and so they needed to extend it to a minute for a possible broadcast buy. And thank you, agency and client, for not ruining the moment with a honking LG logo super. Bravo, Y&R Amsterdam.

A State Of Perpetual Protest

Yasmine El Rashidi's dispatch from Egypt:

While [recent] concessions are a step in the right direction, all it may take to prolong the transition to an elected civilian leadership with true authority is another outbreak of violence. And even if a handover of presidential powers happens as promised, it seems unlikely that the protest movement and the periodic clashes will subside anytime soon.

Poverty levels are stuck at over 40 percent, inflation and prices are high, wages are low, health care is bad, and the education system is abysmal. Even traffic has become a concern – the city is constantly gridlocked, taxing everyone’s nerves. In many ways, addressing such mundane issues may prove to be the most pressing challenge for both the current and future leaders. And even if the plummeting economy does—by some miracle—improve, few are likely to forget the army brutality of the past few months.

Sarah A. Topol finds some schisms between Egyptian Islamists in how to approach the current political situation.

Islamists And The Arab Spring: A Debate

Hussein Ibish and Jeffrey Goldberg have been going toe-toe on the issue for the past few days. First, Ibish:

Some commentators are trying to characterize in broad-brushstrokes what is taking place in Arab political culture. Some are identifying the main feature as a liberationist imperative that has gripped the Arab political imagination. Others warn that popular uprisings without clear aims will inevitably lead to the “victory” of Islamists. Others say we have entered into a period of protracted chaos that will be characterized by increasing violence and conflict within states and regionally. All these views are premature. Elements of each and of all can be found in the events of the past year. But, a clear, overriding narrative that sums up the essence of what is taking place in the Arab world is beyond anyone’s reach.

Goldberg's reply:

I think it's possible to declare a preliminary winner: The Islamist parties that have moved closer to power in Tunisia and Egypt (and will soon enough come to power in Syria). In a recent Bloomberg View column, I outlined some early conclusions.

Ibish's riposte:

It's possible that the Islamists in Egypt might end up dominating a future government across the board. But I think, as I have been arguing since last summer, the more likely scenario in Egypt in the long run is a three-way division of power with the military retaining decisive control over defense and national security, a foreign policy-oriented presidency, and a parliament with wide latitude in domestic affairs (which is where Islamists might really be able to take their share of power in Egypt). But there is also the real possibility that the Islamists have peaked too early, and that their head start has been at least somewhat squandered on gaining a large majority in a powerless assembly. Next time around they may face tougher opposition, less preposterous electoral laws favoring them and a more realistic appraisal by the public of the limitations of their agenda. And, whatever happens, the military and remnants of the former power structure remain a formidable political force the Islamists will have to deal with even if they secure a string of electoral victories for parliament (the presidency, it would seem, is beyond their reach for now).

Goldberg's final sally:

While Hussein, as ever, provides thoughtful and nuanced analysis, I have to — at the risk of appearing overly reductionist analytically — continue to make the obvious point that Arabs are voting, with eyes wide open, for Islamist parties. When they stop voting for Islamist parties, I'll revisit my preliminary conclusion that Islamism is on the rise. 

Today In Syria: Another Bombing

There was yet another suicide bombing in Damascus today. Maysaloon suggests the weight of the evidence points to regime plot:

If people were more cautious about laying the blame last time, there seems to be no hesitation in blaming the regime for this morning's bomb blast in Damascus. Syrian television, with grisly voyeurism, appears to be relishing showing the blood and death that are the by-products of such bombings.

Why are these bombings happening on a Friday? Why have they only started happening now that the Arab League observers are in Syria? So many questions and too few answers. I think the finger of blame can also go the other way, and whilst the regime could plausibly be behind the attacks, we cannot rule out rogue elements in the opposition. The fact that only hours beforehand, Colonel Riad al Asaad had warned of further attacks against the regime, has only stoked the fires of propaganda against the Free Syrian Army. Yet the fact remains, why would a suicide bomber carry out such attacks with such timing and limited success, when there are enormous pro-regime demonstrations that are held in the Ummayad square or in Aleppo? 

Dan Murphy is skeptical. The Economist has a clear summary of the general state of the conflict for the past month or so, including stronger calls from the opposition for intervention. Daniel Serwer takes stock of opposition leader Burhan Ghalioun's new contingency plan of “an international conference on Syria to stop the atrocities and the killings:”

I wonder whether this is an idea worth exploring, admittedly out of desperation.  So far, the Russians and Chinese have stymied the UN Security Council.  It is much harder for them to stymie an international conference, where there is no formal veto and a good deal of pressure to come up with a consensus statement.  The Iranians may even be tiring of what Bashar al Assad is costing them.  If the Syrian government refuses to attend, as well it might, that would enable the SNC to speak for the Syrian people.

Marc Tracy explains why the Assad regime is so important to Iran. Hassan Haider wonders about the future of Syria-Lebanese relations after the current crisis. This music video, an adaptation of a traditional folk song, also manages to compile a number of clips of repression and protest:

Here's an enormous protest in Homs:

And another big one in Idlib asking for international help:

Can Fiction Inspire Movements?

Alyssa Rosenberg wonders:

I’ve been interested for quite some time in communities that do public service and volunteer work based on the principals of their fandom. There’s the Harry Potter Alliance, of course, which grounds its campaigns in Potter-driven values. The Browncoats volunteer groups are inspired by Firefly. AnimeAid got together fans of the genre to raise money and coordinate efforts around Japanese earthquake and tsunami recovery activities. And I suspect that as fandom becomes an increasingly important basis for identity or community, we’ll see more work and organizations along these lines where the values that motivate service are drawn less explicitly from political parties or religious faith and more from powerful fictional texts.

Why Is New Hampshire Good For Romney?

Justin Therriault credits demographics:

Romney was never that popular in Massachusetts, and there’s nothing in his record that would specifically appeal to the New Hampshire GOP (given that his only notable accomplishment was enacting universal healthcare with an individual mandate). Considering the fundamentals in New Hampshire alongside the cross-tabs of the Iowa entrance poll, Romney’s supposed advantage would be more plausibly attributed to the characteristics of NH voters, especially in contrast to Iowa’s caucusgoers… Romney does stand to do well in NH due to a greater number of college graduates and high-income households in NH than in the rest of the country, both groups which favored Romney in Iowa.

What’s Iran Thinking?

Caitlin Talmadge analyzes the Strait of Hormuz standoff:

[N]aval confrontation in the Gulf would benefit no one. It would be bad for everyone, but worst for Iran, whose naval assets are scarce and not easily replaced—a lesson Iran learned the hard way in its last major naval confrontation with the United States, in 1988. With any luck, leaders in Tehran remember these realities. Certainly, their recent behavior suggests a desire to extract leverage by publicly making a threat rather than by stealthily following through on it.