Goldberg condemns Netanyahu for agreeing to release 104 Palestinian prisoners as a precondition for the Kerry-mediated talks that started yesterday:
Two of the men set to be released, according to the Washington Post, are Jumaa Adem and Mahmoud Kharbish, who killed a mother and three of her children in 1988, along with an Israeli soldier who tried to save them. Another is Mohammad Adel Daoud, who killed a pregnant woman and her 5-year-old son in a 1987 firebomb attack. Members of Netanyahu’s cabinet, and many other Israelis, opposed the release, but the prime minister, mindful of pleasing the American government, rammed it through. …
The real tragedy here is that the prisoner release is unnecessary. The Palestinian side was looking for any number of concessions. The Israeli government wouldn’t have been forced to release these murderers from prison had it agreed to a full freeze on the growth of Jewish settlements. … So there you have it. The government of Benjamin Netanyahu would sooner release murderers from prison than stop building apartments on the West Bank.
Shmuel Rosner provides two interpretations of Bibi’s move:
Approving: Yes, it is heartbreaking and enraging to see those cold-blooded killers released. But Netanyahu prefers to pay this emotionally high price rather than pay a price that has strategic meaning. Agreeing in advance to the freeze or to the 1967 line would have much graver consequences than releasing some killers – it would weaken Israel’s position in negotiations, and would weaken the only card it has as it talks to the Palestinians, the land card.
Critical: Yes, agreeing to the 1967 line would be a strategic mistake. But mixing the line and the freeze is a political trick.
In fact, Israel has already agreed to a freeze in the past and it had no serious ramifications. A temporary freeze could have been the wiser choice – and Netanyahu didn’t go for the freeze because he wasn’t sure if he has the votes necessary to approve it. In other words: you aren’t happy with the release of murderers? Blame the coalition, blame hawkish Likud members of Knesset and the Habait Hayehudi party.
Brent Sasley figures the even if the moral cost of releasing the prisoners is high, the actual security risk is low:
[T]he Israeli security clampdown on the West Bank, the security barrier, the siege on Gaza, the Palestinian Authority’s own security measures, and broader stability in the West Bank seem to have removed both the incentive and the opportunity for a renewal of violence and terrorism. The stipulation that those most likely to engage in violence again be deported to Gaza or outside Israel/West Bank only reinforces the importance of this consideration.
In light of this, then, it’s easy to see why Netanyahu decided that releasing these prisoners was the best way to go in order to persuade Palestinians to return to talks. The security and political price was relatively small and easily absorbable. In his analysis [Shin Bet head Yoram] Cohen continued that the release of these prisoners would also lead to “calm” in the West Bank, dampening dissatisfaction with the process and undermining the motivation for a broader uprising. The release is also to take place over stages, and can be stopped any time Israel decides the Palestinians are not meeting their own obligations. And there is probably a sense that many who might engage in terrorism will get caught by normal counter-terror operations anyway.
Olga Khazan notes the popularity of the release in the Palestinian Territories:
[J]ust as Israelis believe passionately that the prisoners are terrorists, Palestinians view them as heroic crusaders, and most see their release as essential to the renewal of talks. According to a recent Gallup poll, the prisoner release was the top precondition for peace negotiations for Palestinians, with 93 percent saying it should be a precondition and 99 percent saying it was a “top priority.”
Previous Dish on the potential of the new talks here and here.
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