You Will Forget This “Issue”

by Jonathan Bernstein

Greg Sargent asks:

Is reconciliation really going to be an issue in the 2010 elections? It seems awfully arcane, but Republicans are signaling they think it’s a political winner.

This is an easy one: while I suppose it's vaguely possible that Republicans could raise reconciliation as an issue in the fall, it's about as certain as anything could be that it won't affect any votes.  First of all, no one knows what reconciliation is; I mean, shockingly few people know what a filibuster is, really, so it's pretty clear that no one knows what reconciliation is.  Be sure to read this great anecdote from Chris Bowers (and a related one from Matt Yglesias).  But beyond that, no one cares.  Really. 

Indeed, there's a good post and discussion thread right now over at the Monkey Cage asking a much more basic question: whether it matters in November whether health care reform passes at all.  What we know is that it's unlikely to have a major effect.  Most people vote based on their party identification.  Beyond that, the economy, the president's popularity, and voter's impressions of the candidates might affect Congressional vote. 

Now, normally, most people don't know or pay a lot of attention to individual House and Senate votes, and those who do pay a lot of attention to politics are the very people most likely to already have strong partisan loyalties, so most of the time it's safe to assume that the risks are low in any particular vote.  However, this has been a very visible issue for over a year.  It's possible that a health care vote might be so high-visibility that it could directly have a (small) effect on some Congressional races.  It's also possible that success or failure on health care could affect general perceptions of Barack Obama, either directly or through elite opinions of the president as a success or failure filtering down to voters.  (I tend to believe the latter is true, and that therefore the best political choice for House and Senate Democrats is to pass the bill).

OK, I hope I was relatively clear there.  The bottom line is that it's pretty complicated to predict whether even a major thing like the success or failure of the president's chief legislative initiative will have a positive, negative, or no effect on November voting.  And if that's hard to determine, then it follows that more obscure things, such as the way the bill was passed, will be forgotten by almost everyone within days of the bill's passage.

Moving To The Center

by Patrick Appel

Clive Crook writes that should the Democrats in Congress get beaten badly in November, Obama "would have to be a centrist president or an outright failure." Brendan Nyhan counters:

Bill Clinton's much-vaunted move to the center may have helped boost his margin in 1996, but improvements in the state of the economy surely played a more important role in the outcome. The "best hope for the Obama presidency" isn't a "drubbing for Democrats in November"; it's a period of sustained economic growth that will boost Obama's approval numbers and increase the likelihood that he'll be re-elected in 2012.

Iran, Iraq, And Rhetoric

So let's pretend you're the Leveretts and here is Crowley angling for some expression of disgust with the Iranian regime. Yes, it's childish, but being veterans of Washington, you understand that the fastest way your (already unpopular) line of analysis can be discredited is if it is shown that you harbor real sympathies for the current crop of Iranian rulers, and not just an unsentimental view of engagement or a hyper-skeptical view of the Green Movement.

Do you play the game or not? Does it really cost you or your views of engagement anything to say you find the regime's anti-Semitic rhetoric vile and insulting?

Larison responds by comparing the Iran debate to the Iraq war debate: 

Before the invasion of Iraq, most opponents of the invasion felt compelled to hedge their statements with endless qualifications, they had to accept the reality of a non-existent WMD threat simply to participate in the conversation, and they often had to go out of their way to state their loathing and disgust for Saddam Hussein. As I have said many times before, this had the effect of undermining antiwar arguments from the very beginning. Having conceded that Hussein was a monster whose downfall they would happily welcome, and having accepted the key claim of the pro-war side that Iraq possessed WMDs and posed a grave threat to us all, many opponents of the war lost the debate before they had even stated their correct case that the war would be a strategic disaster and a terrible mistake. They allowed themselves to be psyched out by the cheap moralizing and shoddy reasoning of war supporters. These war opponents were desperately trying to avoid the smears that were already being used, but all they achieved was to deprive their arguments of whatever moral and rhetorical force they might have had.

Acknowledging reality, that Saddam had done unspeakable things, didn't doom the Iraq war opponents. Overly purple prose was a factor. Endorsing bad WMD reporting certainly didn't help. Still, overall, this is one of Larison's weaker posts. Perhaps we are talking past each other.  I am not asking the Leveretts to pound the table over human rights abuses in Iran. I am asking them wrestle with these tragedies and explain why they don't impact their analysis. Here's one of the Leverett's stronger arguments:

Andrew Sullivan and Scott Lucas criticized our comparison of the December 27 and December 30 crowds by discounting the larger numbers who turned out to support the Islamic Republic on December 30 on the grounds that some of the participants in the pro-Islamic Republic rallies were reportedly ordered to take part and received free transport, cake, and tea.  From a strategic perspective, the most important point here is the comparison between Iran today and in 1978-1979:  when protests started against the Shah, there was no level of state coercion or any amount of tea, cake, or free transportation that could bring significant numbers of people into the street to rally for the Pahlavi regime.  By contrast, the Islamic Republic retains an obvious and demonstrable capacity to elicit such manifestations of support—and that reinforces our argument that the Islamic Republic is not imploding.

This passage is effective because it acknowledges and explains inconvenient facts. Instead of undermining, this amplifies the "moral and rhetorical force" of the argument. Let's contrast the Leveretts with what I consider the single strongest article against the invasion of Iraq, Jim Fallows November 2002 tour de force:

I ended up thinking that the Nazi analogy paralyzes the debate about Iraq rather than clarifying it. Like any other episode in history, today's situation is both familiar and new. In the ruthlessness of the adversary it resembles dealing with Adolf Hitler. But Iraq, unlike Germany, has no industrial base and few military allies nearby. It is split by regional, religious, and ethnic differences that are much more complicated than Nazi Germany's simple mobilization of "Aryans" against Jews. Hitler's Germany constantly expanded, but Iraq has been bottled up, by international sanctions, for more than ten years. As in the early Cold War, America faces an international ideology bent on our destruction and a country trying to develop weapons to use against us. But then we were dealing with another superpower, capable of obliterating us. Now there is a huge imbalance between the two sides in scale and power.

If we had to choose a single analogy to govern our thinking about Iraq, my candidate would be World War I. The reason is not simply the one the historian David Fromkin advanced in his book A Peace to End All Peace: that the division of former Ottoman Empire territories after that war created many of the enduring problems of modern Iraq and the Middle East as a whole. The Great War is also relevant as a powerful example of the limits of human imagination: specifically, imagination about the long-term consequences of war.

There is much more that I could excerpt, but what Fallows does so well is directly address the emotional core of the case for war and disarm it. The Leveretts usually fail in this regard. 

Larison and Kevin Sullivan have both responded to my last post. I'll put up a response as soon as I can.

Sour Greats

by Chris Bodenner

Time recalls eight examples of poor sportsmanship in Olympic history:

With seven gold medals under its belt, the 1972 U.S. Olympic men's basketball team probably expected an easy win over the Soviet Union in the Munich Olympics. Not so — the Americans trailed their Cold War rivals until very end when they inched ahead by a single point. With a second left in the game, a disputed Soviet time-out forced the refs to reset the clock. Time ran out and the U.S. won. But then the clock was reset again — for reasons still disputed by sports fans today. Essentially given three opportunities, the Soviets managed to score a basket and take the gold. "We couldn't believe that they were giving them all these chances," U.S. forward Mike Bantom said at the time. "It was like they were going to let them do it until they got it right." In protest, the American team refused the silver medal; their awards remain unclaimed in a Swiss vault.

This footage of Angel Matos kicking a ref in the face takes the prize.

The Decentralizing Power Of Rivers, Ctd

by Patrick Appel

A reader writes:

As someone with a graduate degree in Russian history from Harvard, I took special interest in the post on "The Decentralizing Power of Rivers." It was fascinating, but not for the expected reasons.

Since the 10th century, the historical core of European Russia has been a vast network of interconnecting rivers spilling out in 4 directions: 1.The Don and Dniepr into the Black Sea. 2.The Volga into the Caspian (with a portage to the Don on the lower Volga, now bridged by the 100 kilometer Volga-Don canal) 3. The Western Dvina and the Neva into the Baltic. 4. The Northern Dvina into the Arctic.

The Siberian hinterland is not connected, but then it is to this day more a wilderness for raw materials than a land for settlement. In connecting the major Siberian rivers, the Trans-Siberian Railway created the backbone infrastructure. What is stunning is that Russia was able to rule Siberia without it.

The Russian Transiberian was a bit longer than the US Transcontinental railroad, but there were many less engineering problems passing through mountain ranges. The European Russian rail network seems no more extensive than the US network at its peak. I wonder if Goodrich and Zeihan were aware we had one.

And Russian road-building is absolutely dwarfed by the US road system.

No, this article was interesting because it was another specimen in my collections of "Curious Lies of Russophobes." Western Russophobes have been predicting the collapse of Russia since at least the seventeenth century. Sooner or later someone will be right, of course, but I wouldn't hold my breath.

Russophobia is however interesting as a somehow necessary component of Western political culture, and as such, worthy of study indeed.

Centralization much more likely due to being confronted with invading and marauding enemies, first from the South (Turkic Pechenegs), then the East (Mongols and Tatars), then, starting in the 17th century, from the West (Poles, Swedes, French, Germans, USA), oh and the Turks (again in the 18th and 19th centuries).

Insomnia

by Patrick Appel

I have the same problem as Jonah Lehrer:

My conscious goal is to fall asleep, which then causes my unconscious to continually check up on whether or not I'm achieving my goal. And so, after passing out for 30 seconds, I'm woken up by my perverse brain. (Most animals lack such self-aware thoughts, which is why our pets never have trouble taking a nap.)

The Daily Wrap

Today the Dish welcomed a third guest-blogger to the mix, Alex Massie. The Blighty-focused blogger sized up Cameron's chances, addressed the class cliquishness of his Tories, called out the dirty politics of Labour over civil liberties, and fretted over the UK economy.

Jonathan Bernstein countered Alter's optimism over the HCR summit, took a closer took at Obama's stagnant poll numbers, looked back at the political stalemate of the Reagan era, took a foray into Watergate, challenged Frum's take on the history of congressional reform, and reiterated his exasperation over filibuster talk. Graeme Wood highlighted a major political challenger to Mubarek, aired different approaches to writing, and touched upon the allure of older women.

Andrew popped in to comment more on the Atlantic redesign. Email of the day here on the subject.

In other Dish coverage, Ambinder summed up new numbers on media consumption, Megan thwacked Jim Bunning's recent antics, Tony Perkins got dissed by military chaplains, Palin got pwned by Alaskans, Cottle caught up with kids of celebrity politicians, McWhorter lauded Obama's approach to education, and Patrick went back and forth with Larison over the Leveretts.

Atheist bait here and here. More religion talk here. Readers chimed in here and here over computer-generated classical music. MHB here. And here is the weekend wrap if you still want it.

— C.B.

Do You Need to Like the Prime Minister? Gordon Hopes Not.

by Alex Massie

What kind of Prime Minister are voters looking for in hard times? Gordon Brown asks the public to take "a second look" at Labour and "a  long, hard look" at the Conservatives. It's a good sound-bite, even if it implicitly concedes that voters are turned-off by Labour. But are they sufficiently disgusted to vote Tory? This is Gordon's attempt to play the part of Dirty Harry, asking the electorate if they're confident they feel lucky today.

Brown may well be a foul-mouthed bully who terrorises his staff and he may well bear much of the responsbility for the country's parlous economic situation, but he's asking voters to ignore the latter (focus on the future!) and consider the former proof of the Prime Minister's passion and willingness to get his hands dirty. Sure, he's "difficult" to work with, but this is no time for simpering angels in Downing Street. 

It's an audacious gambit: Yes, you may hate me but when did I ever ask you to like me? I'm not Tony Blair, you know. Can he pull it off? I still doubt it. Heck, common sense demands that one doubt it. But…

In total contrast to Brown, David Cameron can occasionally seem as though he's the kind of Englishman that might be played by Hugh Grant. Decent, amiable, brightish, but, in some sense, lacking bottom. He even lives in Notting Hill. This is doubtless an unfair caricature, but there is a feeling that the Camerons live lives of such comfort and, yes, wealth, that they are insulated from the concerns of"ordinary hard-working families".

Rachel Sylvester, one of the smartest, best-connected columnists around, captures something of this in the Times today:

The narrowing in the Tory poll lead can, at least in part, be explained by the fact that Mr Cameron still too often gives the impression that he thinks he was “born to rule” rather than that he has to campaign to become Prime Minister with a clear idea of what he wants to do with the job.

It’s not just the well-scrubbed public schoolboy’s face, the slick, neatly brushed hair or the smart-enough- to-dress-down open-neck shirt. It’s not just the expenses claim for wisteria trimming or the organic veg patch or even the Eton and Bullingdon Club background.

The Notting Hill set that runs the Tory Party has managed to create a feeling that they are, as Sir Nicholas Winterton put it so memorably, a “different class of people”.

[…] When Mr Cameron describes the Conservatives as the “party of the poor” it conjures up a picture of the local grandee handing out food parcels to hungry villagers. When the Tory leader hugs huskies it looks a bit like Prince Charles hugging trees, an environmentalism rooted in a desire to conserve. The “broken society” is something theoretical and remote from the white stuccoed villas of West London or the white beaches of Belize.

This isn’t class war. There is a cliquishness to the Cameron circle that conveys the sense that its members are detached from the rest of the country. They are godparents to each others’ children, they share school runs and swap dinner parties. Unlike those around Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Tony Blair or Gordon Brown, key members of the inner group are bound together by friendship first and politics second. There is an incestuousness to a set that had rows and reconciliations, romances and rejections, way before it ever thought of seeking power.

But, as they come to an election, voters want to know whether the Conservative leader would be an effective Prime Minister, not whether he is a loyal friend. It’s not enough for Mr Cameron to think that he would be good at the job, or to believe, in a rather patrician way, that it is his duty to serve his country. He has to convince a sceptical electorate that he has a sense of mission about the kind of Britain he wants and a sense of purpose about how he would create it.

Again, this is not wholly fair and far from the whole story. But there's something to it. Cameron's life has not been trouble-free (he recently marked the anniversary of the death of his young, severely disabled, son Ivan) and Brown, however much he might pretend otherwise, has not worked his way up from some benighted housing project.

Nevertheless, the election is, on one level, a contest between hard and soft power. This actually extends to the candidates' political philosophies too: Brown is a "hard" centraliser, Cameron a "soft" distributist. The latter, though in keeping with the way we live our lives these days, may be a tougher sell – especially in rocky, fretful times.

Sure, common-sense demands that we laugh at any Brownite claim that Gordon is a "safe pair of hands" but that's what he's pitching. If you're bold and brassy enough perhaps you can get away with anything. Cameron's challenge, then, is not merely a question of reminding voters of Brown's failures, but of convincing them that he has the guts and the courage and the steel to really tackle the problems Britain faces.  

But he must also be wary of falling into the trap of seeming too harsh, too judgemental, too de haut en bas. It's a tricky problem: how to convince voters that you're tough enough without also reminding them of the (perceived) harshness that has cost the Tories dearly in recent elections and helped Labour to three crushing victories. Brown might be able to get away with being the "Nasty Candidate", the Tories, in part because of the leadership's privileged backgrounds, cannot be seen again as the "Nasty Party".