Waldman couches the intervention in Iraq in terms of Obama’s foreign policy doctrine, and particularly in contrast to that of his predecessor:
When he ran for president, Obama promised a new approach to military involvement overseas, one defined by limited actions with clear objectives and exit strategies. It was to be a clean break with the Bush doctrine that had given us the debacle of the Iraq War: no grand military ambitions, no open-ended conflicts, no naïve dreams of remaking countries half a world away. Of necessity, that means American military action is reactive. Instead of looking around for someone to invade, this administration has tried to help tamp down conflicts when they occur, and use force only when there seems no other option — and when it looks like it might actually accomplish something, and not create more problems than it solves.
But even though it’s designed to avoid huge disasters, this approach carries its own risks, particularly when we confront situations like the one in Iraq where there are few good options. We can take some action to keep IS out of the Kurdish north, but that might leave them just as strong, with their maniacal fundamentalism still threatening the entire region. IS is a truly ghastly bunch, with ambitions that seem unlimited. Obama said he was acting “to prevent a potential act of genocide.” What if it happens anyway, and we could have done more?
Ezra Klein focuses on how Obama expressed that doctrine in last night’s announcement:
Calling something a “genocide” has a very particular power under international law, because the US is signatory to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.
The treaty says that “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.” The US is one of those Contracting Parties. Obama is justifying these strikes under international law as, in part, an effort to prevent a genocide.
But he’s stopping there. He’s willing to use air strikes to protect Americans and Kurds in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, and to stop a genocide against the Yazidi men and women trapped in Sinjar. But he’s not willing to go further, at least not barring substantial political change in Baghdad. … Obama doesn’t oppose all wars. But to him, a smart war is a very, very limited war.
For Joe Klein, this marks the start of a new chapter in our seemingly endless war on Islamist terrorism:
Yes, we’re sick of war, sick of the region and particularly sick of Iraq–but, as seemed clear in the days after 9/11, and less clear since, this is a struggle that is going to be with us for a very long time. It doesn’t need to be the thunderous, all-consuming struggle that the Bush-Cheney government made it out to be. It will require a strategic rethink of who our friends and enemies actually are in the region. (As others have suggested, we may find that Iran is part of the solution rather than part of the problem–this is one case where America’s and Israel’s national security interests may diverge). And it will require a far smarter response than our first attempts to deal with Al Qaeda. It will have to be measured, proportionate–an insinuation rather than an invasion, acting in concert with true allies who also understand the threat and are capable of sophisticated covert operations.
Larison weighs in with characteristic skepticism:
As reasons for military action go, these are better than most, but I keep coming to the conclusion that these airstrikes are still a mistake. Many of the usual objections to military action don’t apply here, but a few still do. The airstrikes are being presented as a “limited” response, but it is hard to believe that military action of this kind will continue to be “limited” for very long. It is also taken for granted that military action won’t make things worse, but it is entirely possible that it will.
These airstrikes are at best a stop-gap measure to slow the advance of ISIS’ forces, and to the extent that they are effective they will likely become an ongoing commitment that the U.S. won’t be able to end for the foreseeable future. Administration officials claim that there is no plan for a “sustained” campaign, but now that airstrikes have begun it will be only a matter of time before there are demands for escalation and deeper involvement, and sooner or later I expect that Obama would yield to those demands. Having made the initial commitment and having accepted that the U.S. has a significant military role in Iraq’s internal conflicts, the U.S. will be expected to continue its commitment for as long as ISIS exists, and that will leave the U.S. policing the Iraqi civil war for months and years to come.
Noah Millman also has doubts:
I am terrified by what ISIS represents. I think a case can be made that our top priority for Iraq and Syria should be defeating the group. Logically, though, that likely means accepting an Assad victory in the Syrian civil war and greater Iranian influence in Iraq. And accepting those two outcomes puts us on the opposite side from the major Sunni powers, particularly Saudi Arabia. What else will we have to sacrifice to mollify them? Back when ISIS first came on the scene in Iraq, I argued that we have a moral responsibility to do what we can to ameliorate the situation in Iraq, but also that direct military intervention would likely prove counter-productive. As the situation in northern Iraq gets worse and worse, I stand by both views.
Lexington highlights “a contradiction between the extreme narrowness of the missions handed to American commanders, and the breadth of the crisis that senior American officials are starting to describe in Iraq”:
It is not clear whether Mr Obama and his inner circle consider spiralling instability in Iraq in and of itself a threat to American national security. Iraqi politicians have been wrangling over the creation of a new government for weeks. In a not so subtle nudge, Mr Obama said that more American assistance would be on offer once a new government was in place. …
Critics might also reasonably ask why averting a massacre in Sinjar should prick American consciences now, when so many other towns have fallen to the fanatics of IS without stirring a response from Washington (and when massacres in Syria have triggered a pitiful response from the West). Much of the answer involves recent advances by IS fighters towards Erbil. The Kurds are not just long-standing American allies, their capital has also become an important safe haven for refugees. American officials called Erbil “increasingly threatened” by IS on August 8th.
Though airstrikes alone won’t defeat ISIS, Paul Iddon argues that they can make a difference:
American air-power alone won’t defeat an irregular militia like Islamic State. But it can be effectively used in order to stop movements between the Islamic States’ captured territories as well as seriously hamper their efforts of consolidating their hold and control over those areas. Also coupled with extensive humanitarian aid it will serve to keep the tens-of-thousands of civilians that group displaced alive and in turn help stave off a humanitarian catastrophe. So all in all US air-power if used properly will be a worthy endeavor to help Iraq and especially the Kurds who find themselves and everything they have built over the last few years, under the auspices of American forces, at risk of destruction.
That being said the United States shouldn’t necessarily feel compelled to follow an air campaign up with an extensive deployment of boots on the ground. A decisive air campaign that will give those Iraqi state forces preparing to fight Islamic State time to get their act together and the government to take necessary reform and reconciliation steps to function as an effective governmental institution for the multi-denominational and multi-ethnic and cultural, and imperfectly secular, state which Iraq on the whole broadly constitutes.
On the other hand, Brett Logiurato relays concerns that they might backfire:
Phyllis Bennis, a scholar at the Institute for Policy Studies, progressive think tank, told Business Insider that the decision to launch airstrikes now could undermine the U.S. push for a new, more inclusive government. “The ‘humanitarian’ mission has already crept. The return of direct US military engagement will be seen in Iraq in the context of proving US support for the corrupt and discredited prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, widely blamed for expanding and consolidating the sectarian political system put in place with the US occupation,” Bennis said.
“It will also undermine any possibility that al-Maliki might step down, paving the way for a broader, less sectarian government in Baghdad (the deadline was supposed to be today), since a Maliki administration with the full backing of the US military is hardly likely to give in to public political pressure to step down.”
The Dish 